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Abstract 
 
The present study shows that an abrupt onset cue that is not consciously perceived can 
cause attentional facilitation followed by inhibition at the cued location. The observation of 
this classic biphasic effect of facilitation followed by inhibition of return (IOR) suggests that 
the subliminal cue captured attention in a purely exogenous way. Since IOR is not observed 
following endogenous shifts of spatial attention, but is observed following exogenous, 
stimulus-driven shifts of spatial attention, it is unlikely that top-down control settings or other 
non-attentional effects played a role. The current findings are interpreted in terms of a 
neurobiological model of visual awareness. 
Introduction 
 
It is well-known that abrupt onsets can capture attention in an exogenous way (see e.g., 
Theeuwes, 1991, 1994b; Yantis & Jonides, 1990; but see Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 
1992). Peripheral cueing paradigms demonstrate that when a visual abrupt onset is used as 
a cue, spatial attention exogenously shifts to the cued location (e.g., Posner, 1980). In this 
paradigm, participants fixate the centre of the screen while a salient abrupt onset cue 
appears briefly on either the left or the right of fixation. After a short delay a target is 
presented. Even though the cue does not contain any information about the upcoming 
location of the target, participants are faster and more accurate in responding to targets that 
appear at the cued than at the uncued location, sometimes labelled as the facilitation effect. 
Furthermore, if there is a delay between the offset of the cue and the onset of the target, 
participants are slower and less accurate in responding to targets at the cued than at the 
uncued location, called inhibition of return (IOR; cf. Posner & Cohen, 1984). It is important to 
note that IOR at a location in space only follows after attention has shifted reflexively to that 
location (see Klein, 2000, for a review). Indeed, IOR does not follow a shift of attention that is 
directed endogenously (voluntarily; Posner & Cohen, 1984; Pratt, Kingstone, & Khoe, 1997), 
except in conditions in which participants endogenously prepare an eye movement (Rafal, 
Calabresi, Brennan, & Sciolto, 1989).  
Recently, spatial cueing paradigms were used with peripheral cues that were not 
consciously perceived. Although these cues did not reach subjective awareness, the results 
became part of a discussion as to whether visual onsets capture attention automatically, or 
capture attention only when they are contingent on top-down goals. For example, McCormick 
(1997) investigated the attentional effects of cues above and below subjective threshold. In 
order to separate endogenous from exogenous orienting of attention, he used an informative 
cue. When participants were unaware of the peripheral cues, a facilitation effect at 
unexpected locations was found, but there was no IOR. He reasoned that the absence of 
IOR may be caused by top-down strategy used by the participants. However, the facilitation 
effect was induced by exogenous attentional capture of the cue. A potential problem of 
McCormick’s study was the fact that part of the participants task was to report whether or not 
they had detected the cue after each trial. Therefore, the cue may have captured attention 
because it was part of the attentional set.  
Ivanoff and Klein (2003) specifically addressed this issue using a spatial cueing 
paradigm. Participants first completed a condition in which they performed a go/no go task 
without reporting the presence or absence of the masked peripheral cue. Subsequently, they 
performed the same task in which they were also required to report whether or not they had 
detected the cue. Ivanoff and Klein found a facilitating effect, but no IOR, when cue report 
was part of the task and found IOR, but no facilitation effect, when cue report was not part of 
the task. In their view, the cue caused an exogenous shift of attention in both conditions, but 
attention was disengaged rapidly when the cue was task irrelevant. They argued that the 
facilitation effect could not be found because it was combined with early IOR (as in Danziger 
& Kingstone, 1999). In contrast, attention would remain engaged at the cued location when 
the cue was task relevant and thereby causing the facilitation effect, but no IOR. Based upon 
these findings, they concluded that a facilitation effect can only be found when the cue is part 
of the attentional set (Folk et al., 1992). 
More recently, Ansorge and Neumann (2005) tried to distinguish between facilitation 
effects due to top-down goals and facilitation effects due to bottom-up or stimulus driven 
capture. They used a spatial cueing paradigm with metacontrasted primes in which the target 
was the mask and the primes were smaller replicas of the target. In line with the direct 
parameter specification theory (DPS; Neumann, 1990), Ansorge and Neumann reasoned 
that the prime could give information about the appropriate response, or the prime could be 
contingent on top-down goals. Therefore, they systematically reduced the information the 
prime could give. Assessment of awareness of the primes was performed after the reaction 
time task. First, they found that the facilitation effect of cue validity (same location as the 
target) disappeared when the prime differed from the target in colour - although they did find 
a nonsignificant difference in the direction predicted by the bottom-up capture view. Second, 
the facilitation effect of validity also disappeared when the position of the prime gave no 
information about the appropriate response. Third, they found a significant facilitation effect 
only when the position of the prime gave information about the appropriate response. 
Ansorge and Neumann concluded that attention was not captured exogenously by these 
primes, but was captured only when it fits the topdown attentional setting. 
In the current study, we wanted to determine whether it is possible to obtain cueing 
effects in a task in which the nonconsciously perceived cue captures attention in a bottom-up 
fashion. Therefore we designed a paradigm in which the cue did not resemble the target, 
gave no information about the appropriate response, was uninformative about the location of 
the upcoming target, and in which cue report was not part of the task. In addition, we 
employed a novel approach to present cue stimuli subliminally. One of the three discs that 
served as placeholders was presented just an instant earlier. We expected this disc to attract 
attention by its sudden onset and thereby serve as a cue. Because the other two discs 
followed immediately, it gave the impression that all three discs appeared simultaneously. 
For this reason, we expected that the ‘‘cue’’ would not be perceived consciously. If 
exogenous nonconscious attentional cueing effects exist, we expected to find faster 
detection when the target appears immediately after the cue at the cued location than when it 
appears at the uncued location. Furthermore, if this shift of attention is indeed exogenous, 
with a long delay we expected the occurrence of IOR, i.e., slower detection of the target at 
the cued location than at the uncued location. 
Method 
 
Participants 
Sixteen paid volunteers (aged 18_24) participated in the experiment. All participants had 
normal or corrected to normal vision. 
 
Apparatus and design 
The stimuli were presented on a 19-inch monitor using a PC with a 1024_ 768 resolution and 
a refresh rate of 120 Hz. E-Prime software (Psychology  Software Tools) was used for 
stimulus presentation and data recording. All stimuli were presented on a grey background 
(x_0.286, y_0.322: Luminance 4.6 cd/m2). During the experiment, two different tasks were 
administered, first a subliminal cueing task followed by a ‘‘cue report’’ task. The subliminal 
cueing task consisted of five blocks of 40 trials. Each condition consisted of 40 trials which 
were randomly presented during the experiment. The cue was not informative of the location 
of the upcoming target. Catch trials (20%) were included to avoid anticipation. Each trial 
began with a black fixation cross in the centre of the screen that stayed on for 1000 ms (see 
Figure 1). The fixation cross disappeared for 200 ms, after which one of the discs was 
presented. The disc consisted of a grey filled circle, 1.98 in diameter (x_0.287, y_0.315: 
Luminance 12.7 cd/m2) that was presented for 16 ms either 6.78 to the left or to the right of 
the centre of the screen. Following this first disc, a display consisting of two more discs, each 
with the same size and luminance as the first disc, was presented. The resulting display 
containing the three discs was positioned in a straight line with their centres separated by 
6.78. Either simultaneously with the onset of the latter two discs, or after an SOA of 1000 ms, 
a target stimulus appeared. 
This target consisted of a small black dot that could appear inside either the left or 
right disc. After 80 ms, the target stimulus was extinguished and after another 200 ms the 
discs disappeared and the grey background was presented for 1000 ms before the next trial 
began. The ‘‘cue report’’ task consisted of four blocks of 20 trials that were identical to the 
detection time task, including the 20% catch trials without a target, with the exception that the 
trial ended when a response was given. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were seated 75 cm from the computer screen with their head positioned on a 
chinrest. They were explicitly instructed to remain fixated on the centre of the screen. 
Participants had to press the space bar as soon as they detected the target. Note that they 
were not informed about the temporal difference in onset of one of the discs. The experiment 
started with a practice block of six trials. If participants pressed the spacebar before the 
presentation of the target, or if they responded to late (i.e., more than 630 ms after target 
onset), a sound was presented indicating a wrong response.  
After conducting the subliminal cueing task, we assessed whether participants were 
able to perceive the earlier onset of one of the discs when they were instructed to do so. 
Participants were asked to ignore the target, but to indicate which of the discs, the left or the 
right, was presented an instant earlier than the other two discs, by pressing respectively the 
‘‘z’’ key or the ‘‘m’’ key. In half of the trials the disc on the left was presented an instant earlier 
and in the other half of the trials on the right. Each trial ended when a response was given 
and no sound was presented when given a wrong response. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. From bottom to top, succession of events in a trial in which the cue 
happened to be valid. On the left the sequence in a trial with a long SOA is 
depicted, on the right a trial with a short SOA. 
 
Results 
 
Cue report task 
Participants all gave a subjective report afterwards about not being able to perceive the cue. 
A one-tailed binomial test for each participants revealed that none of the participants scored 
significantly above chance level. Mean detection performance in the cue report task was 
50% (min. 44% and max. 59%) and not significantly above chance level (p=.98). 
 
 
 
Subliminal cueing task 
Response reaction times with a latency of less than 100 ms and a latency of more than 630 
ms (0.4% of all trials) were omitted from analysis. Mean response error rate on the catch 
trials was 3.4%. A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with SOA (short and 
long) and cue validity (cued location vs. uncued location) on detection time showed a 
significant main effect of SOA, F(1, 15)=69.5, p<.01, MSE=816.8, and a significant 
interaction effect of SOA and cue validity, F(1, 15)=20.9, p<.01, MSE=46 (see Figure 2). 
Planned comparisons showed a facilitation effect at the short SOA; detection times at 
the cued location were faster than at the uncued location (402 ms vs. 413 ms), t(15)=2.79, 
p<.05. More importantly, at the long SOA this effect reversed: At the cued location detection 
times were slower than at the uncued location (350 ms vs. 345 ms), t (15)=2.24, p<.05. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean response detection time at the cued location (solid line) and 
the uncued ocation (dotted line) with a short and long SOA. 
 
 
Discussion 
 The present study shows that cueing effects typically obtained in peripheral cueing 
paradigms (e.g., Posner, 1980) persevere even when the peripheral cue is not consciously 
perceived. Although the effects are not as pronounced as when a visible cue is used, the 
classic biphasic effect of facilitation followed by inhibition is clearly observed. Whereas 
previous studies using subliminal cues reported ambiguous results with respect to the 
occurrence of facilitation and inhibition (e.g., Ivanoff & Klein, 2003), the current study is the 
first to show the classic effect of facilitation followed by inhibition using subliminal cues. Since 
it is generally agreed that IOR is the product of reflexive, involuntary orienting, the current 
findings also provide evidence that subliminal cues can cause exogenous attentional 
orienting.  
One could argue that the cue we used was part of the attentional set because (1) the 
cue was presented at a possible target location and (2) the cue and the target were both 
defined by onsets. Even though we cannot completely rule out the possibility that attentional 
set played a role, it should be noted that the cue was uninformative and we did find IOR. As 
noted, IOR is associated with reflexive shifts of spatial attention (Theeuwes & Godijn, 2002). 
There may be several reasons why previous studies did not find a facilitation effect 
(Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Ivanoff & Klein, 2003). Contrary to earlier studies, we used a 
relatively short SOA (i.e., 16 ms) and presented the target immediately following the cue 
instead of using an interval between cue and target. This corresponds with Ivanoff and 
Klein’s conclusion that attention at the cued location is disengaged rapidly when the cue is 
not task relevant. Theeuwes, Atchley, and Kramer (2000) investigated the time course of 
disengagement of a (visible) distractor that captured attention in a visual search task by 
using different SOAs between distractor and target and by manipulating the congruence 
between them. They found that although an attentional-set could not prevent attentional 
capture by a salient stimulus, it did assert its influence on the time course of disengagement 
of attention. The disengagement of attention from the distractor location took much longer 
when the distractor and target had the same defining properties. It is possible that this same 
process takes place in a short spatial cueing paradigm with subliminal cues. If the cues are 
not task relevant, a facilitation effect would only manifest itself if the cue is immediately 
followed by the target. 
The reason why participants were unable to consciously perceive the cue, could be 
explained within the neurobiological model of visual attention and awareness by Lamme 
(2003). Presenting the disc for 16 ms without follow up of the other discs, is enough to lead 
to visual awareness. However, if the disc is followed immediately by the other two discs, 
there is no conscious perception of the first disc. Central to Lamme’s model is the distinction 
between an initial feedforward sweep followed by recurrent processing, which is necessary 
for a visual stimulus to reach consciousness (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). The visual 
information of the first disc could have been replaced by new visual information of the three 
discs before recurrent processing of the first disc had led to visual awareness (Di Lollo, Enns, 
& Rensink, 2000). The exogenous shift of attention, caused by the cue, could also be 
explained within the model. The initial feedforward sweep can give rise to a reflex-like, 
unconscious output or modification of behaviour of information. The superior colliculus is one 
of the earliest activated areas by the feedforward sweep and is, among other brain 
structures, involved in attentional processes such as attentional capture, IOR, and 
oculomotor programming (see for reviews Klein, 2000; Shipp, 2004; van der Stigchel, 
Meeter, & Theeuwes, 2006). It receives visual input directly from the retina as well as from 
the visual cortex and processes visual information via the quick pathway to the parietal 
cortex (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). Given this line of reasoning, the initial feedforward 
activation induced by the first disc may have reached the superior colliculus, which produced 
the attentional effects. In fact, a study by Kentridge, Heywood, and Weiskrantz (1999) with a 
blindsight patient seems to imply that the superior colliculus is responsible for mediating 
these nonconscious attentional processes. The patient in this study responded faster to 
targets that appeared at a cued than at an uncued location, although he was neither aware of 
the cue nor of the target. Previously, this same patient was scanned in an fMRI study by 
Sahraie et al. (1997). They tested brain activity in his blind hemifield generated by visual 
events of which the patient was aware - meaning some sort of ‘‘feeling’’ that something has 
happened - and visual events of which the patient was unaware. They found that subcortical 
structures and in particular the superior colliculus were activated in trials in which the patient 
reported no awareness of a visual event. Because the damage to his visual cortex had been 
more than 30 years ago, one could argue that pathways mediating visual attention in the 
brain had changed. Nevertheless, future research with healthy participants using subliminal 
cueing stimuli could give more insight in the role of the superior colliculus and orienting 
attention without awareness. 
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